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STATINTL

The Deed Was Done Quickly, But It's Macbeth Who's Dead

April 19, 9:15 p.m.

Here in Washington, and earlier at the UN in New York, it was being whispered that if the Cuban deed were to be done, it would be best if it were done quickly. And so, it seems, these Shakespearian prayers have been granted, except that it is Macbeth not the King who lies slain. The rebel invasion of Cuba, as this is being written, seems to have been crushed. There is an atmosphere of deep gloom at the State Department. The President, due to "the press of business," has just announced that he will be unable to witness that week-end naval training exercise off the Florida coast, and the Navy followed this a few minutes later by cancelling the exercise altogether, though it was supposed to have been routine. Several hours before the news came over the UPI ticker that rebel headquarters had lost all contact with the troops on the beachhead in Las Villas ("Do you want me to evacuate you?") seems to have been the last words transmitted to them by the commander of an offshore supply vessel), the AP's State Department correspondent John M. Hightower had already filed a dispatch saying that the rebel invasion "was reported on excellent authority today" to have failed to set off "the political defections and uprisings" on which the expedition had counted. The failure was a failure of intelligence, and it is being said jokingly in the State Department press room that after the U-2 incident and the debacle in Laos, the Cuban defeat is the third strike against the CIA, and on three strikes it should be out. Fidel Castro will have done us a favor if his cleanup of the invasion also leads to a cleanup of Allen Dulles and the CIA. They have again demonstrated their incompetence.

Counter Revolutionaries Too Pink for Dodd

The shattering of the invasion hopes may also shatter the Kennedy honeymoon. The post mortems had begun before the defeat was confirmed. On the hill, a Senate Internal Security subcommittee under Dodd of Connecticut has been holding executive sessions today to hear complaints from the wilder right wing of the Cuban emigration against the Miro Cardona coalition. A preview was provided in last night's *Washington Star* where its right wing columnist Constantine Brown attacked the Miro Cardona coalition as too far Left, and predicted on the basis of earlier hearings by Internal Security "should the present counter-revolution succeed, there will not be much change in the totalitarian policies of Castro." On the other hand, the Left wing of the emigration had already begun to grumble bitterly about Kennedy. Those who had hoped for a new Fidelism without Fidel were disappointed on two scores. The first is that they had been forced to accept an economic and social program tailored to the moderate right and inconsistent, in their view, with the hopes aroused by the *Alianza para el progreso*. The second is with the invasion itself, in which they had had

The Cast Changes, But Not the Hypocrisy

"It would perhaps be in order for me to inform the Council that while the reports that we receive on the situation in Guatemala are incomplete and fragmentary, the information available to the United States thus far strongly suggests that the situation does not involve aggression but is a revolt of Guatemalans against Guatemalans."

—Henry Cabot Lodge at the UN, June 20, 1954

"If the Castro regime has hostility to fear, it is the hostility of Cubans, not of Americans. . . . If the Castro regime is overthrown, it will be overthrown by Cubans, not by Americans. I do not see that it is the obligation of the United States to protect Dr. Castro from the consequences of his treason to the promises of his revolution. . . ."

—Adlai Stevenson at the UN, April 17, 1961

little hope from the beginning.

One of the key points to watch, I had been told earlier, was the choice of military leader for the invasion forces. There were two candidates. The candidate of the anti-Castro left led by Manolo Ray was Col. Ramon Barquin, the most respected military figure in the emigration, an army officer who had been imprisoned by Batista for revolting against him. Col. Barquin was named military commander of Havana by Fidel and defected last summer. Col. Barquin was against any large scale invasion, predicting that it would be disastrous if attempted because the time for it was not ripe; he is reported to have said that it would be militarily difficult and psychologically bad, uniting the Cuban people behind Castro against what would inevitably appear to be a foreign inspired invasion. He was in favor of infiltrating small groups and working from within. The candidate of the right wingers was Captain Manuel Artimé, a young man in his late 20's, a member of the *Agrupacion Catolica*, who had served for a month or two with Castro in the Sierra Maestra. He was described to me as "the pin-up boy of the CIA" and the darling of the right wing *Diario de la Marina*, which only last Saturday appealed for a new government which would exclude all who had ever served with Castro. Capt. Artimé was, however, to be forgiven his short stay under Fidel's banner and it was Captain Artimé who was chosen to command the invasion. The right wanted a man of its own in charge of the troops, and a man who shared its objective. This was not a new popular uprising but a beachhead on which a provisional government could quickly be established and then appeal for American arms and American military support. The paymasters of the counter-revolution, the big sugar and oil and other companies which helped finance the invasion, didn't invest their money to buy themselves

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